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  SOMALI PIRACY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF SEAFARERS 
SOFIA GALANI* 
 
Abstract 
Somali piracy has attracted the world’s attention over the last decade and whilst Somali 
piracy abates, the debate on its various aspects remains lively. This paper aims to shed light 
on one particular aspect of Somali piracy that remains unexplored – the violations of the 
human rights of seafarers, and especially those taken hostages. Despite the suffering of 
seafarers at the hands of pirates, their protection seems to fall beyond the human rights 
framework due to the non-state status of pirates. The lack of a human rights-oriented 
approach is reflected by significant counter-piracy responses, including the UNSC 
Resolutions, criminal responses and the conduct of naval operations that are reviewed here. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the traditional negative obligations of States and the evolution 
of the positive human rights obligations of States can offer a legal avenue for the better 
protection of the human rights of seafarers.  
(Keywords: hostages, seafarers, piracy, human rights) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Piracy has been known since antiquity, but it drew the world’s attention over the last decade 
when pirate attacks revived off the coasts of Somalia.1 The high rates of Somali pirate 
incidents produced various responses from the international community. Co-ordinated 
counter-piracy efforts yielded significant results and over the last year Somalia-based attacks 
                                                          
* Sofia Galani is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Bristol Law School. I am indebted to my supervisor, 
Professor Malcolm Evans, for his comments on earlier versions of this paper.   
1 The term piracy will be broadly used in this paper to encompass piracy and armed robbery. Piracy is defined in 
Article 101 of the 1982 UNCLOS. Armed robbery is defined by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
in its Resolution A.1025 (26) (2009) Art2 (2.2) ‘Code of Practice for the investigation of crimes of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships’. For the re-emergence of Somali piracy see A Palmer, The New Pirates: Modern 
Global Piracy from Somalia to the South China Sea (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014) 123-124.  
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dropped to their lowest level in six years, with only 9 recorded pirate attacks.2 Arguably, the 
international community did not only commit to put an end to the ‘evils’ of piracy, but also 
demonstrated its commitment to achieve this goal without sacrificing human rights. 
Therefore, human rights law seems to have played a crucial role in how counter-piracy 
responses have been shaped and States seem to have acknowledged their human rights 
obligations towards pirates.  
Nevertheless, this paper is not aimed either at assessing the effectiveness of counter-
piracy efforts per se or their compliance with the human rights obligations of States to 
pirates. The aim of this paper is to examine counter-piracy responses from the perspective of 
the victim. More specifically, this paper aims to shed light on a piracy related problem that 
has not gained the attention it deserves – the violation of the human rights of seafarers, and 
especially those who have been taken hostages. Although there has been no successful 
hijacking over the last year, as of July 2015, there were still 26 seafarers in captivity for more 
than two years.3 The development of Somali piracy into a business model generating profits 
through ransom has made pirates daring and violent.4 Somali pirates do not hesitate to 
employ lethal force during their attacks or inflict severe pain on seafarers with a view to 
extracting their ransom. This means that seafarers, and particularly those taken hostages, 
suffer a significant risk of human rights violations, such as threats against their life, ill-
treatment, illegal detention and breach of their privacy. Seafarers in other regions around the 
world affected by piracy are also confronted with the same risks. While the focus of this 
paper is on Somali piracy, it should be noted that the ‘kidnap and ransom’ model of piracy 
has been steadily employed by pirates around the world and this makes the analysis of this 
                                                          
2 ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB), ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: 1 January- 30 
September 2014’ at www.hellenicshippingnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2014-Q3-IMB-Piracy-
Report-ABRDGED.pdf (accessed 11 October 2015). Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) reported 142 incidents of 
pirate activity in the Western Indian Ocean Region, ‘The State of Maritime Piracy 2014’ (2015) 27 at 
www.oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/StateofMaritimePiracy2014.pdf (accessed 11 
October 2015). The low numbers of pirate attacks have been challenged on the ground of inaccurate reporting. 
See J Huggins & L Kane-Harnett, ‘Somali Piracy – Are we at the End Game?’ (2013) OBP 2-3 at 
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Jon%20Cleveland%20Document%20_final.pdf 
(accessed 11 October 2015). 
3 UNODC, ‘Maritime Crime Programme’ (2014) 28, OBP (2015), ibid, 29 
4 For a full analysis of the functioning of Somali piracy as a business model, see World Bank (a), ‘Pirate Trails: 
Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa’ (2013) 37-75 and World Bank 
(b), ‘The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation’ (2013) 108-110.  
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article relevant to the protection of human rights of seafarers attacked and held hostages in 
other regions.5  
While there have been some regional soft law instruments, namely the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct and the Declaration condemning the violence against seafarers, which pay due 
attention to the suffering of seafarers attacked and held hostages by pirates, their human 
rights protection has yet to be seriously considered. Arguably, the status of pirates as ‘non-
state actors’ may mean that the protection of seafarers falls beyond the human rights 
framework, as States do not bear responsibility for the suffering of seafarers at the hands of 
pirates.6 However, the evolution of the positive obligations of States to prevent and put an 
end to human rights violations, when they know or ought to have known that individuals are 
at risk,7 offers an alternative avenue for the protection of the human rights of seafarers. This 
paper will first discuss the violations of the human rights of seafarers in the context of piracy. 
It will then assess some of the most significant counter-piracy responses, namely the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, the criminalisation of piracy and the naval 
operations, which mirror the lack of recognition of the human rights of seafarers. The lack of 
a human rights conscious approach will be contrasted with the evolution of the human rights 
framework that demonstrates how States could be responsible for stepping in and putting an 
end to the violations of the human rights of seafarers, while also respecting their traditional 
negative human rights obligations in the fight against piracy. It will be concluded that some 
regional and international efforts made to protect the victims of hostage-taking can provide a 
pattern for more human rights oriented initiatives that could offer enhanced protection to 
seafarers.  
                                                          
5 OBP, ‘The State of Maritime Piracy 2013’ (2014) 2 68 at 
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/SoP2013-Digital.pdf (accessed 11 October 2015), OBP, 
‘Human Cost of Maritime Piracy 2012’ (2013) 13 at 
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/View%20Full%20Report.pdf (accessed 11 October 
2015) 
6 Art2 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (2001) Yearbook of the ILC, vol II. For an overview, see J Crawford, State Responsibility - The 
General part (Cambridge: CUP, 2013). 
7 The international and regional human rights bodies have established that States have negative, positive and 
procedural human rights obligations. See also the discussion in A Clapham (ed), Human Rights and Non-State 
Actors (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), P Alston (ed), Non-state Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 
2005), J Crawford, J A Pellet and S Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (Cambridge: CUP, 
2010).   
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2. TRANSLATING THE HUMAN COST OF PIRACY INTO HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 
There are many areas around the world affected by piracy,8 but Somali piracy has at least two 
distinct characteristics that make it important to assess from the victim’s perspective. The 
first is that Somali piracy has proved highly adaptive and the modus operandi of pirates has 
been fast evolving. This has made Somali piracy a constant threat to the welfare of seafarers. 
Despite the reduced pirate activity, the sustainability of the current counter-piracy measures 
has been questioned and fears have been expressed that Somali piracy has not come to an end 
yet.9 The second trait of Somali piracy is that it has developed into a business model that 
yields profits through ransoms.10 Unlike piracy in other regions, Somali piracy has a 
dominant objective, which is to ransom the crews and vessels.11 Given that seafarers are the 
target of Somali pirates, the human cost of Somali piracy demands special review. Although 
the human cost of piracy has been discussed by officials and analysed by various research, it 
is worth asking what the human cost of Somali piracy means. In the context of the human 
cost of piracy, the deaths, injuries, ill-treatment, prolonged captivity and breaches of privacy 
of seafarers have been examined. Translating the suffering of seafarers into the language of 
legal norms means that we are not talking about anything else but the violations of the human 
rights of seafarers, namely their right to life, freedom from torture, freedom from illegal 
detention and privacy, which are being reviewed below. 
                                                          
8 See the IMB live piracy map at www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map (accessed 11 October 
2015).  
9 Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2014/140) 7 at 37, Huggins, above n 2, 9, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia 
(S/2013/623) 16 at 70. Palmer, above n 1, challenges this approach and argues that piracy is not a function of the 
failure of Somalia, but a result of the failed reconstruction attempts of the West, 9-10.   
10 World Bank (a), above n 4, 39-44 
11 For piracy off the coasts of West Africa see C Marts, ‘Piracy Ransoms-Conflicting Perspectives’ (2010) One 
Earth Future Foundation 9-11, NM Murphy, ‘Petro-Piracy: Predation and Counter-Predation in Nigerian 
Waters’ in D Guilfoyle (ed) Modern Piracy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013) 78-84. For Southeast Asia, see D 
Ong, ‘Alternative Approaches to Piracy and Armed Robbery in Southeast Asian Waters and off the Horn of 
Africa: A Comparative Perspective’ in P Koutrakos & A Skordas (eds) The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: 
European and International Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) 269-276 and R Beckman, ‘Piracy and 
armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia’ in Guilfoyle (2013) 24-25. 
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2.1. THE CURRENT NATURE OF SOMALI PIRACY: FROM ‘ROBIN HOOK’12 TO CRIMINAL 
ABDUCTORS  
The phenomenon of piracy has evolved over the last decade and has now been transformed 
into a profitable criminal business. It is estimated that an amount between US$340 million 
and US$435 million was paid in the form of ransoms for ships and/or seafarers kidnapped by 
Somali pirates between 2005 and 2014.13 Apart from the marginal opportunities to escape 
poverty that have encouraged Somalis to turn to the lucrative business of piracy, it should 
also be noted that Somalis possess the sea-going and military skills to become pirates.14 
Pirates have been heavily armed and do not hesitate to fire automatic weapons and Rocket 
Propelled Grenades (RPGs) against vessels and their crews.15 Pirates have also proved to be 
highly adaptive, and the sophistication of their modus operandi is striking. Among the most 
notorious techniques operated by pirates remains the use of the “mother vessels”, which 
ranges from fishing dhows to larger vessels.16  
2.2. THE ESCALATING VIOLENCE AGAINST SEAFARERS   
The highly evolving nature of piracy has had an adverse impact on the welfare of seafarers. 
The victims of piracy have been confronted with unprecedented levels of violence. During 
the period 2010-2014, almost 9,688 seafarers were attacked by pirates, 2,878 seafarers came 
in close contact with pirates, when their vessel was boarded, and 2,060 seafarers were taken 
hostages.17 During a pirate attack, seafarers face serious risks of being injured or killed, as 
pirates employ lethal force against them. The perils posed to the welfare of seafarers are 
increased when a vessel has armed guards on board, as seafarers may get caught up in the 
crossfire.18 The psychological distress that seafarers suffer is also severe. In the case where 
seafarers have to hide in a citadel upon a pirate attack, they may be attacked by pirates for 
                                                          
12 World Bank (b), above n 4, 87 
13 ibid 30-31, OBP (2014), above n 5, 10, OBP (2015), above n 2, 20 
14 Palmer, above n 1, 9, 42, 99 
15 UNSC Resolution 1838(2008), Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues related 
to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, ‘Summary: A plan of 25 proposals’ (S/2011/30) at 12 (hereafter, the Jack 
Lang Report) 13 at 15 
16 Jack Lang Report, ibid, 13 at 15 
17 OBP (2013), above n 5, 3, PBP (2014), above n 5, 38, OBP (2015), above n 2, 27  
18 OBP, ‘The Human Cost of Somali Piracy 2011’ (2012) 8-9, 20 at 
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/hcop_2011.pdf 
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days awaiting help from naval forces.19 It is worth highlighting that up until 2011-2012, when 
piracy reached its peak, seafarers did not receive any anti-piracy training or counselling, and 
the seafarers who come from developing countries still do not have access to these services.20 
This means that seafarers are prepared only for the traditional hardships experienced at sea, 
but not for exchange of fire and armed attacks, as if in a warzone. The first clinical research 
conducted on the psychological impact of piracy on seafarers shows that they do not have 
enough ‘mental preparation’ for pirate attacks and suffer increased anticipatory stress about 
traversing known zones of piracy.21 The same results were released after a survey of the IMB 
on the feelings of seafarers about piracy across regions, in which on a scale of 1 to 5, 
seafarers rated with a 4 their stress and scare when they have to transit sea routes off Somalia, 
and with a 3.5 their inability to focus on work.22 In addition to the risks of being injured or 
killed and the great distress that seafarers face upon a violent pirate attack, they also face the 
risk of being taken hostages. In the same IMB survey on seafarers’ concerns about specific 
events in Somali piracy, seafarers rated with more than 4 out of 5 their concern about being 
kidnapped by pirates.23 It was noted that there has been no successful hijacking over the last 
year, but at the time of writing, there are still 26 seafarers being held hostages by pirates.24 
The hostages, who are still in captivity, are considered to be ‘high risk’ hostages, as there is 
an increased likelihood of abuse or death and minimum chances of release.25 Apart from the 
hostages still held in captivity, the abuses that seafarers have already suffered at the hands of 
pirates should not be ignored. Hostages have been facing extremely long periods in captivity, 
with periods of detention on the increase. In 2010, the average of detention was five 
months,26 in 2011 it increased to six months,27 and for the seafarers captured in 2012 the 
                                                          
19 According to the IMO, ‘a Citadel is a designated pre-planned area purpose built into the ship where, in the 
event of imminent boarding by pirates, all crew will seek protection’. See IMO, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against ships in waters off Somalia’ (MSC.1/Circ.1339) (2011) 37. 
20 Marts, above n 11, 31. It is worth highlighting that the majority of seafarers come from developing and other 
non-OECD countries, OBP (2013), above n 5, 39. 
21 MS Garfinkle, et al, ‘The psychological impact of piracy on Seafarers’ (2012) The Seaman’s Church Institute, 
5-6  
22 OBP (2013), above n 5, 8 
23 ibid 2 
24 UNODC, above n 3, 1 and OBP (2015), above n 2, 29 
25 OBP (2013), above n 5, 39, 40-41  
26 ibid 16 
27 ibid 11 
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average detention period was more than 11 months.28 Most of the hostages that remain in 
captivity have been detained for more than two years.29  
The conditions of detention of seafarers have also changed dramatically. Until about 
2010, the predominant belief held by officials and presented by the media was that pirates are 
‘humane captors’ and treat hostages well.30 For example, after the release of the French 
yacht, Le Ponant, which was seized in 2008 with its 30 crew members, it was broadcast that a 
Good Contact Guide was found on board outlining the appropriate treatment of hostages.31 
However, the accounts of released hostages refuted the theories that pirates treat them with 
respect. The crews of 23 released vessels in 2010 and 2011 and eight released vessels in 2012 
and 2013 reported to the IMB the abuses they were subjected to in captivity.32 The accounts 
given by the 11 remaining hostages, who escaped from MV Albedo, and the seven released 
hostages of MV Asphalt Venture in 2014 also brought to light new information about the ill-
treatment inflicted by pirates.33 All hostages stated that they suffered regular threats of 
physical violence, continuous psychological stress and abuse, confinement, loss of privacy, 
and loss of self-esteem. The reports of physical abuses that hostages suffered, including being 
punched, pushed, slapped, and burned by cigarettes, increased from 50 per cent in 2010-2011 
to 100 per cent in 2012-2013. In addition, 10 per cent and 15 per cent of the hostages released 
in 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 respectively reported extreme cases of violence, including being 
tied up in the sun for hours, locked in freezers, and having fingernails pulled out with pliers. 
Other reported abuses included systematic isolation, deprivation of privacy, malnutrition and 
lack of drinkable water.34 Pirates also put psychological pressure on their hostages, as they 
make them phone their relatives to beg for help at gunpoint, tell them that their families 
abandoned them or the negotiations broke down and their organs will be cut out and sold on 
                                                          
28 ibid 4. According to OBP, the crew of FV Naham 3 has been in captivity for 1,140 days, OBP (2015), above n 
3, 30.  
29 ibid 
30 OBP (2012), above n 19, 12 
31 Marts, above n 11, 8 
32 OBP (2013), above n 5, 6 
33 OBP (2015), above n 3, 30-31  
34 K Houreld, ‘AP Interview: Somali pirates torturing hostages’ (2011) The Guardian at 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9479830 (accessed 11 October 2015), The Telegraph, ‘Somali pirates 
raise ransom stakes’ (2011) at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/8440471/Somali-pirates-raise-
ransom-stakes.html (accessed 11 October 2015) 
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the open market.35 The psychological impact on seafarers is irreversible, as almost all 
seafarers held hostages suffer various forms of post-trauma disorders.36  
Overall, the evolving nature of Somali piracy has had a significant human cost, which is 
often overlooked in the literature, as seafarers suffer a number of human rights violations 
upon a pirate attack and while in captivity. Their right to life is constantly threatened, they 
remain in captivity for prolonged periods of time and they are deprived of their right to 
privacy. The forms of physical and psychological ill-treatment that hostages suffer are also 
severe and can, in some instances, amount to torture.37 The following assessment of some of 
the most vital counter-piracy responses will demonstrate that States have failed to address the 
issue of the violations of the human rights of seafarers. 
3. HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS GAPS IN THE FIGHT 
AGAINST PIRACY 
The impact of Somali piracy shocked the international community that adopted a range of 
measures to combat and prevent it. The effectiveness of the international counter-piracy 
efforts is uncontested in the light of the decline of Somali piracy over the last year. It is also 
incontrovertible that States have taken note of the suffering of seafarers in their fight against 
piracy. The EU Deputy Secretary General for the External Action Service, Maciej Popowski, 
who took over the lead of the Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia (CGPS) on 
behalf of the EU, reiterated the commitment of the international community to tackle the 
human cost of piracy. Acting as Chairman of the CGPS, the EU delegate stated that the first 
priority is to have ‘zero ships and zero seafarers in the hands of Somali pirates’ further adding 
that ‘we must never lose sight of the humanitarian cost of piracy and must continue to support 
                                                          
35 OBP (2013), above n 5, 7, OBP (2014), above n 5, 40, Palmer, above n 1, 66 
36 Garfinkle, above n 21, 8, OBP (2015), above n 2, 32-33, 87-90 
37 Although the legal term of torture requires that the pain or suffering ‘is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity’, as per Article 
1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, here it is 
used to indicate the ‘torturous nature’ of the act, as perceived by the victims. See MD Evans, ‘State 
Responsibility and the European Convention of Human Rights: Role and Realm’ in M Fitzmaurice & D 
Sarooshi (eds) Issues of State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2004) 150-151. See also the accounts given by released seafarers on Save Our Seafarers, ‘Pirates tortured us, 
says freed MV Albedo sailor’ at www.saveourseafarers.com/pirates-tortured-us-says-freed-mv-albedo-
sailor.html (accessed 11 October 2015).  
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those who have paid the highest price’.38 Although States are aware of the suffering of 
seafarers, they have failed to acknowledge that one of the humanitarian costs is the actual 
violation of the human rights of seafarers. As it will be explained below, the recognition of 
the breaches of the human rights of seafarers means that States could have positive 
obligations to protect seafarers, while also complying with their negative obligations in the 
fight against piracy. Nevertheless, States have not seriously considered their human rights 
obligations yet and this is reflected in the current counter-piracy responses that suffer human 
rights gaps. 
3.1. THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS 
The UNSC has adopted a number of Resolutions that focus on piracy39 or the chaotic 
situation in Somalia that contributes to piracy.40 On 2 June 2008, the UNSC first used the 
powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and authorised States, which cooperate with the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) in the fight against piracy, to enter the 
territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing piracy.41 Although this decision 
may seem revolutionary, the UNSC was extremely careful when crafting the Resolution. A 
number of strict restrictions in relation to the time and space, the protection of innocent 
passage, respect for international law and cooperation with the TFG limit the use of these 
powers. This cautious approach of the UNSC has been seen as more hortatory than a 
revolutionary one that could bring effective results in the fight against piracy,42 but it could 
be understood in the light of the paramount importance for the UNSC to clarify and ensure 
that this authorisation is a special exception which will not create customary international 
law.43 However, what cannot be explained is that the UN, as a major international human 
rights actor, failed to prioritise the protection of seafarers against the increasing violence they 
suffer and adopt firm measures that could ensure their safety. First of all, the delay of the 
                                                          
38 CGPS, March Newsletter 2014, 1  
39 UNSC Resolutions 1816(2008), 1838(2008), 1846(2008), 1851(2008), 1897(2009), 1918(2010), 1950(2010), 
1976(2011), 2015(2011), 2020(2011), 2077(2012),  2125(2013)  
40 UNSC Resolutions 1844(2008), 1872(2009), 1964(2010), 2010(2011), 2036(2012), 2067(2012) 
41 UNSC Resolution 1816(2008)  at 7 
42 For a more detailed analysis of the restrictions of the UNSC Resolution 1816(2008) see T Treves, ‘Piracy, 
Law of the Sea, and the Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) E.J.I.L, 403-405, T 
Treves, ‘Piracy and the International Law of the Sea’ in Guilfoyle, above n 11, 130. 
43 D Guilfoyle, Shipping interdiction and the law of the sea (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) 68-69, Treves (2009), ibid, 
403 
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UNSC to officially acknowledge the danger of hostage-taking and the violence seafarers 
suffer left few chances for resolute decisions. While the figures started showing the escalation 
of violence and the increased hostage-taking incidents since 2007, it was not until April 2011 
that the UNSC officially referred to hostages and the adverse impact on their families and 
called for the immediate release of hostages.44  
The failure of the UNSC to stress the human rights suffering of seafarers earlier had a 
domino effect of further delayed recognition by States and maritime officials of the suffering 
of seafarers.45 It was not until 2011 that it was officially acknowledged that hostages are 
‘systematically tortured’ and physically abused by pirate gangs.46 The acknowledgement that 
there are seafarers that face serious dangers and human rights violations could trigger the 
responsibility of the flag State to protect them. It is submitted that the protection of the 
human rights of hostages could be established through the combination of the relevant 
provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and 
developments of international human rights law.  
Pursuant to the 1982 UNCLOS, vessels are subjected to the exclusive jurisdiction of their 
flag State on the high seas (Article 92) and the latter has to ‘effectively exercise its 
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its 
flag’. The duties of flag States include, amongst others, their obligation to apply maritime, 
shipping, criminal and civil laws to their flagged ships.47 This means that while the 1982 
UNCLOS sets out the core framework of piracy and aims to address the traditional hardships 
that seafarers experience at sea, it cannot protect the human rights of seafarers.48 This is not 
to say that this gap in the protection of seafarers cannot be filled. The term ‘jurisdiction’ of 
                                                          
44 UNSC Resolution 1976 (2011) preambular paragraph. The first reference to the safety of seafarers and other 
persons was made in the UNSC Resolution 1950 (2010) without any further call for action. 
45 The UNSC generally referred to the escalation of violence in pirate acts in its UNSC Resolutions 1838(2008), 
1950(2010), 1976(2011), 2015(2011), but did not specify that the use of violence by pirates targets seafarers and 
hostages.  
46 n 34 above 
47 For the duties of flag States see RA Barnes, ‘Flag States’ in DR Rothwell, AG Oude Elferink, KN Scott & T 
Stephens (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford: OUP, 2015) 304-324 and Y Tanaka, The 
International Law of the Sea (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) 157-159.  
48 T Treves has argued that many provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS can be seen from the viewpoint of human 
rights law, T Treves, ‘Human Rights and the Law of the Sea’ (2010) 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 
1-14.  
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the jurisdiction clauses of the various human rights treaties has been broadly interpreted, and 
this might allow some room for suggesting that flag States, in addition to their maritime, 
shipping, criminal and civil laws, also have to ensure that their human rights laws are 
complied with on board their flagged vessels. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has 
interpreted the jurisdictional clause of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) (Article 2(1)) broadly and concluded that contracting parties ‘must respect 
and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective 
control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party’.49 In the 
key case of Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, the HRC concluded that a State can be ‘held 
accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the 
territory of another State.50 The travaux preparatoires of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) also indicate that it was within the intentions of the drafters to avoid 
strict jurisdictional criteria, such as a territorial reference and hence, the final provision 
(Article 1) did not include any strict requirements.51 Under the current development of the 
ECtHR jurisprudence, the human rights protected by the Convention shall be secured extra-
territorially when States have effective control over individuals (the personal link) or a 
territory (the spatial link)52 with recent case law showing that the Court also takes into 
account the conduct of Contracting Parties abroad for the purposes of asserting authority and 
assuming control over individuals.53 The personal link is established when a person is 
brought under the jurisdiction of a State.54 In the context of piracy, the personal link is 
                                                          
49 HRC, General Committee No.31 (2004) CCPR/C21/Rev.1/Add.13 at 10. See also the HRC, General 
Comment No.24 (1994) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 at 7 and the discussion in K Da Costa, The Extraterritorial 
Application of Selected Human Rights Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 17-41 and M Gondek, The 
Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties 
(Utrecht: Intersentia, 2009) 92-105.  
50 Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, Communication No. 52/79 (1981) at 12.3.See also Tomuschat’s individual opinion 
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particularly relevant to the seized vessels and seafarers, as the ECtHR has confirmed that a 
State has jurisdiction over a vessel flying its flag55 and over the persons on board vessels 
intercepted by its State agents.56 
In the light of the emerging threats posed to the human rights of seafarers and the broader 
interpretation of jurisdiction of the human rights treaties, it could be argued that flag States 
should ensure that their human rights legislation is also complied with on board their flagged 
ships. This could permit the human rights of those seafarers attacked by pirates to be better 
protected, as victims should be considered to be within the jurisdiction of the flag State for 
the purposes of human rights. The latter could give rise to the obligation of a flag State to 
take preventive measures against pirate attacks or put an end to the captivity of hostages. That 
said, the preventive human rights obligations of States are qualified, which means that States 
are responsible for protecting individuals against the violations they suffer by other 
individuals, when they know or ought to have known that individuals are at risk.57 This 
obligation was confirmed by the ECtHR in the case of Finogenov and others v Russia, which 
remains a key case for hostage-taking issues and the protection of hostages.58 In this case, the 
Strasbourg Court examined the Dubrovka theatre siege and clarified that Russia would have a 
duty to take specific measures and prevent the attack only if the authorities knew or ought to 
have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to life.59 The obligation 
of States to prevent human rights violations committed by non-state actors has been further 
outlined and enforced through cases involving extraditions or refoulement. The ECtHR has 
established that a State can be found acting in breach of its human rights obligations by 
exposing an individual to ill-treatment or other human rights violations, even if such 
treatment is imposed by non-state actors.60 
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In accordance with the existing jurisprudence, the threshold for engaging State protection 
in the context of piracy would seem to require establishing whether flag States knew of a 
‘real and immediate’ risk to life. In the context of piracy, it is now uncontested that seafarers 
traversing the High Risk Area (HRA)61 are known to be at risk.62 Furthermore, the state-of-
the-art equipment of vessels permits the crews to immediately inform the piracy reporting 
centres, such as the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), the EU Maritime Security 
Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and 
independent naval forces of an imminent pirate attack.63 This means that flag States bound by 
the ECHR may be found acting contrary to their human rights obligations, if they are aware 
of an imminent attack upon a vessel, but fail to take action to prevent the attack and the 
taking of the crew hostages.64 It has also been argued that States might be found to be acting 
in breach of their preventive obligations, when they knowingly send seafarers to piracy sea 
zones, without providing adequate training and counselling on how to deal with potential 
pirate attacks.65  
Although States have positive obligations to protect the human rights of seafarers against 
the violations they suffer in the context of piracy, the UNSC has failed so far to put these 
violations in context. While the drafters of the 1982 UNCLOS were not expected to predict 
the brutal attacks against seafarers by pirates and provide for the protection of the human 
rights of seafarers in the context of piracy, the UNSC had become aware of these violations. 
However, the hortatory language of the UNSC Resolutions and the delayed 
acknowledgement of the suffering of seafarers by the UNSC have allowed States to escape 
their human rights obligations to the victims of piracy. On the contrary, it will now be shown 
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that the UN and States have been extremely cautious about ensuring compliance with the 
protection of the human rights of pirates. 
3.2. CRIMINAL RESPONSES  
The UNSC through its resolutions has repeatedly called States to criminalise piracy and adopt 
a legal framework for the effective prosecution of pirates.66 To the question of why the UN 
has been striving to establish effective prosecution mechanisms, when piracy is the 
quintessential example of universal jurisdiction and all States have jurisdiction to prosecute 
the hostis humani generis, the answer is given by the low rates of pirates prosecuted until 
2011.67 In 2011, 738 pirates were detained in 13 countries as suspects or guilty of engaging in 
piracy.68 This number was only a small fraction of the 2000 pirates who have been 
apprehended since December 2008, and shows that only one out of 10 captured persons was 
being prosecuted.69 This begs the question of why States have been reluctant to prosecute 
pirates whose criminal activities have ‘contaminated’ the sea routes causing unprecedented 
economic and human costs. The roots of this problem will be assessed with a view to 
highlighting the impact that these failures have on the protection of the human rights of 
seafarers. 
3.2.1. Practical constraints 
As outlined from the outset, it must be noted that the case of piracy in Somalia is more 
complicated, since States have been authorised to enter the Somali territorial waters for the 
purpose of repressing piracy.70 Until June 2014, the Somali territorial sea was 200nm making 
the situation more complex during the peak of pirate attacks, as pirates apprehended within 
the extended Somali territorial waters were subject to different jurisdictions, such as that of 
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the flag, port or coastal states.71 This does not seem to be the case anymore, as, on 30 June 
2014, the Somali President declared a 12nm territorial sea and proclaimed a 200nm EEZ.72  
Despite the UN calls for cooperation in determining jurisdiction, the ‘disposition and 
logistics’73 labyrinth has become more complicated in combination with the political and 
human rights constraints related to the prosecution of suspected pirates.74 Moreover, the 
release, instead of detention and prosecution, of pirates has been considered to be more 
practical.75 The transfer of pirates to ports, after their capture, may need a lengthy and 
expensive diversion. For naval forces, this means that more vessels would remain exposed to 
the danger of being attacked in the meantime. Therefore, military forces prefer to be engaged 
in a ‘catch and release’ strategy, or disruption operations, in which arms and equipment used 
in committing piracy are seized or disposed of, but pirates are released after being captured.76 
This ensures that vessels are not left unprotected for a considerable matter of time. Despite 
the efforts to increase the arrests and prosecution of suspected pirates, these types of 
operations ‘remain the most common naval counter-piracy tactic for a variety of practical, 
operational and legal reasons’, some of which are explained below.77   
3.2.2. Political unwillingness 
Kenya, which was the first State to exercise its universal jurisdiction in 2006 and has been 
active in prosecuting pirates, noted that other States do not have the political willingness to 
exercise their jurisdiction.78 There are different reasons that make States reluctant to 
prosecute pirates. One of the reasons is the fear that there might be retaliation against the 
vessels that fly their flags; and hence, States are willing to prosecute suspects only when their 
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national interests are affected.79 Moreover, there are States that do not wish to be left with 
any apprehended pirates that cannot be deported after the prosecution or the imprisonment 
due to claims of asylum or non-refoulement obligations.80 The British Foreign Office, for 
instance, although it has never provided any legal basis for the potential asylum claims made 
by pirates, has repeatedly warned the Royal Navy against detaining captured pirates.81 
Therefore, the United Kingdom has entered into Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with 
the countries of the region that permit the transfer of pirates and trial before Courts in the 
region.82 
The unwillingness of some States to shoulder their responsibilities for the proper 
prosecution of pirates has made these few States that detain and try pirates to refuse to further 
undertake this heavy burden alone. In March 2010, Kenya gave a six-month notice of 
withdrawal from the bilateral agreements it had entered into with Canada, China, Denmark, 
the EU, the United Kingdom and the United States, but consented to consider case-by-case 
transfers.83 These kinds of refusals may force other States to undertake piracy prosecutions 
themselves, but it also exposes the danger of more pirates being released without any 
prosecution posing renewed threats to seafarers. 
3.2.3. Human Rights Considerations  
Furthermore, there are human rights constraints that prevent the effective detention and 
prosecution of pirates. The States bound by the ECHR have to consider at least the three 
following human rights restrictions in the manner they treat pirates: firstly, they cannot detain 
on board arrested pirates for a prolonged period of time without judicial supervision;84 
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secondly, they cannot deport pirates to States where they might face the risk of torture;85 and 
finally, they cannot transfer pirates to countries where their right to a fair trial might be 
denied.86 The ECtHR has now well-established case law that protects the human rights of 
those on board intercepted vessels. In both the Medvedyev and Rigopoulos cases, the ECtHR 
found that a 13-day and 16-day detention, respectively, on board of the vessel for the 
purposes of transferring the captured persons to national ports were incompatible with the 
meaning of promptness under Article 5(3) of the ECHR.87 However, in these cases no 
violation was found because the delays were justified under the exceptional circumstances of 
these cases. These obligations have been reiterated by cases examined in the context of 
counter-immigration operations. In the key case of Hirsi Jamaa, the ECtHR held that the 
applicants, who were originally found on board of vessels that were intercepted by the Italian 
naval forces, and were then transferred to Italian military ships and returned to Libya, ‘were 
under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities’.88 
Therefore, the ECtHR found that the alleged violations brought before it by the applicants fell 
within Italy’s jurisdiction.89 
In line with this jurisprudence and within the context of piracy, the Rotterdam District 
Court also found that a time span of 40 days between the apprehension of a Somali pirate and 
his presentation to a Judge brings about a violation of Article 5(3) of the Convention, but this 
was found irrelevant to the criminal proceedings.90 The ECtHR also examined cases brought 
by Somali pirates who challenged the legality of their detention by French agents.91 This time 
the question of jurisdiction was not even raised by France that accepted that the arrested 
pirates were within the French jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. In 
this light, the Court concluded that the six days the Somalis spent in detention between their 
                                                          
85 above n 60  
86 Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK (2012) (Application no.8139/09) 
87 Medvedyev v France (2010) at 65-69, Rigopoulos v Spain (1999) (Application no.37388/97)  
88 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (2012) (Application no.27765/09) at 81 
89 ibid at 82. See also Sharifi and others v Italy and Greece (2014) (Application no.16643/09) at 214-225, The 
Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al v United States, Case 10.675, Report No. 51/96, Inter-Am.C.H.R (1997) 
at 183-188, P.K. et al v Spain, Communication No. 323/2007, UN Doc. CAT/C/41/D/323/2007 of 21 November 
2008 at 8.2 
90 Samanyolu Case, Judgment of 17 June 2010, LJN: BM8116, Rotterdam District Court, 10/600012-09, 6-7 
91 Ali Samatar and Others v France (2014) (Application nos.17110/10 and 17301/10) and Hassan and Others v 
France (2014) (Application nos.46695/10 and 54588/10) 
  The Human Rights of Seafarers 
32 
 
arrest and transfer to France did not breach Article 5(3).92 However, the Court found France 
in breach of Article 5(3) due to the two-day detention of the pirates in France, before they 
were brought before a judge.93 
In addition, the absolute prohibition of torture under the ECHR may challenge the 
decisions of European governments to transfer pirates to countries where the conditions of 
detention amount to inhuman and degrading treatment, or where the death penalty is still in 
use.94 Overcrowding, lack of proper medical treatment and allegations of ill-treatment are 
amongst the most significant defects of the detention facilities of the region that raise 
concerns about the safety of the human rights of pirates.95 In this vein, the Court of 
Administrative Law in Germany declared illegal the transfer of pirates to Kenya due to poor 
conditions of detention.96 Furthermore, the concerns over the use of capital punishment, 
which is prohibited by Danish law, made the Danish navy release captured pirates instead of 
surrendering them to Somali authorities.97 
The international community seems to have seriously contemplated its human rights 
obligations to pirates and have adopted a number of robust measures to uphold this aim. The 
UN constant calls for criminalising piracy have always been accompanied by the legal 
safeguard that the incarceration and conviction of pirates must be consistent with the 
applicable human rights law. Both the UN and EU made clear that no agreements regarding 
the transfer and trial of pirates will be allowed to enter into force, unless the contracted 
parties guarantee the protection of the human rights of pirates.98 The EU-Kenya agreement, 
for example, contains a number of human rights safeguards, such as legal safeguards against 
torture or guarantees for prompt and fair trials.99 The importance that the EU attributes to the 
protection of the human rights of pirates has also been stressed by the requirement for 
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constant monitoring of the situation of pirates after their transfer to the State that will be 
prosecuted.100 More importantly, the UN has invested large amounts of money in reforming 
the Courts and prison facilities in Somalia and other countries in the region with a view to 
making them human rights compliant.101 In addition, the Counter Piracy Programme (CPP) is 
aimed at reforming the domestic courts and detention facilities in Somalia, Seychelles, 
Kenya, Mauritius and Tanzania by training personnel, providing interpretation services and 
offering training courses and rehabilitation assistance to detained pirates.102 The cost of the 
CPP is estimated to reach US$30.49 million between early 2012 and mid-2014, of which 
US$9.38 million has already been contributed.103  
Although these human rights considerations and efforts should be commended, especially 
after taking into account that the ‘foot soldiers’ of piracy are involved in pirate activities not 
out of choice but as a matter of survival,104 we are now left with the peculiar outcome of 
seriously considering the human rights of pirates, but losing sight of the rights of victims. It 
flows logically that as pirates fall under the jurisdiction of States, when arrested and detained 
on vessels flying their flag, the victims of piracy should also fall under the same jurisdiction, 
when arrested and detained by pirates on board. It seems only right that the enhancement of 
the human rights safeguards aiming to protect pirates from violations of their right to freedom 
from illegal detention and torture should apply mutatis mutandis to the victims of piracy. In 
the legal sphere, however, these arguments can be contested on the ground that pirates are 
detained by State agents, while seafarers are attacked and abused by non-state actors. It was 
noted from the outset of this paper that according to the traditional State responsibility 
principle, States are responsible only for wrongful acts attributed to them and thus, State 
responsibility cannot be triggered for the illegal acts of pirates against their victims.105 This 
has the unorthodox consequence of protecting the perpetrators of pirate criminal activities, 
but not the victims. Thus, it is suggested that the solution to these human rights gaps is to 
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make use of the alternatives that the human rights framework offers that could hold States 
responsible for equally protecting the rights of the victims of piracy.   
3.2.4. The Impact of the Criminal Counter-Piracy Responses on the Human Rights of 
Seafarers  
States, for a considerable period of time, let pirates escape justice due to practical constraints, 
political unwillingness and human rights deliberations. Seafarers could see their abductors 
being released and posing renewed threats to their welfare. States tried to address these three 
constraints in the prosecution of pirates by injecting lots of money in reforming the Courts 
and prisons in the region. Currently, seafarers see their abductors’ human rights being rigidly 
safeguarded, while theirs are still being overlooked. The effectiveness and sustainability of 
these responses are yet to be seen. It has been evidenced that the prosecution rates have not 
changed fundamentally and there have also been reported cases in which corrupted officials 
in the region authorised the release of pirates on dubious justifications.106 The inclusion of 
piracy under the jurisdiction of the newly established African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights might improve the effectiveness of the prosecution system and relieve the burden of 
the Courts in the region.107 However, the unwillingness of the Western States to share the 
prosecution backlog and the incapacity of international community to carry on spending 
money on pirate detention facilities or monitoring the conditions of detention in the long run 
will also affect the effectiveness of counter-piracy efforts. As a result, seafarers face the risk 
of being confronted again with pirates who re-embark on pirate attacks after escaping justice 
due to the strict human rights precautions.  
3.3. NAVAL OPERATIONS  
The NATO Operation Ocean Shield and EU Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) Operation 
Atalanta, as well as independent national naval forces from the US, China, India, Japan and 
others, have been actively involved in the fight against piracy in the region.108 These naval 
operations have proven a vital tool against piracy and amongst others, they have also been 
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engaged in a number of rescue missions aimed at releasing hostages. The successful 
outcomes of some of rescue missions were enough to spark enthusiasm and encourage more 
action of the same kind.109 For instance, the rescue mission of Captain Phillips of the 
American-flagged MV Maersk Alabama by the US Navy in 2009 that was brought to life in 
the Hollywood movie Captain Phillips gives the impression of legendary missions in which 
commandos step in and save hostages in the most miraculous fashion.110 In practice, 
however, rescue missions do not always have a ‘happy end’.111 For example, in 2009, a 
French hostage was killed when the French forces stormed the yacht Tanit that had been 
hijacked in the Gulf of Aden.112 Another raid by the Danish Asbalon, which operates under 
the command of NATO, resulted in the death of two hostages, who were badly injured by fire 
and died soon after.113 The Royal Navy has also been involved in similar raids, with one that 
claimed the life of a Yemeni national in 2008.114 A more deadly raid was conducted by the 
Indian Navy in 2008 claiming the lives of 15 seafarers on board.115 
The unpredictable reactions of pirates during rescue missions pose further risks to the 
welfare of hostages. It has now become a standard practice for pirates to use seafarers as 
human shields during a rescue attempt.116 In other cases, when pirates become aware of naval 
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presence, they drag hostages on the deck and beat them until the naval vessel retreats.117 
More extreme reactions could give rise to further dramatic incidents, such as the cruel murder 
of the four American hostages, who were shot on board the yacht Quest, while the American 
naval forces were on the way to conduct a rescue mission.118   
Rescue missions can be vital for the release of hostages, particularly in cases that 
negotiations stall or there is no insurance behind hostages to pay the ransom, but under 
certain circumstances they can turn out to be fatal for hostages demonstrating how urgent it is 
that States comply with their traditional negative human rights obligations and refrain from 
committing human rights violations during their operations at sea. The ECtHR has clearly set 
a number of criteria that make rescue missions human rights compliant. It is now well-
established that there is human rights compliance when a rescue mission is accurately 
planned in advance,119 including accurate evacuation plans and readiness for providing 
medical assistance;120 the use of lethal force is only a last resort and absolutely necessary in 
defence of persons from unlawful violence;121 the modus operandi is carefully chosen to 
attain the primary aim of a rescue mission that should always be the protection of the lives of 
hostages;122 and the rescue team has taken all the precautions to minimise incidental loss of 
life.123 Although these criteria were developed by the ECtHR after examining operations on 
land, there seems to be no reason why these could not apply to rescue missions at sea. This 
means that hostages should be entitled to human rights protection, and they could potentially 
bring claims under Article 2 against the States whose naval forces conduct rescue missions. 
Whereas it was concluded that hostages could and should be protected during the conduct 
of rescue missions, two more legal barriers may arise. The first one derives from the extra-
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territorial character of rescue missions. Sea operations conducted for the safe release of 
hostages take place miles away from the borders of States and thus, outside the traditional 
notion of their jurisdiction. This can be interpreted by States as absolving them of their 
human rights obligations. The second legal lacuna in the protection of hostages might arise 
from the fact that most of the rescue missions are not conducted by independent naval forces, 
but by vessels operating under the mandate of an international organisation (IO). For 
instance, does the responsibility of deaths or injuries caused by the German naval forces that 
act as Force Command of the EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta lie with Germany or with the 
EU?  
3.3.1 The Question of Extra-territoriality: Are States Responsible for Protecting the Human 
Rights of Seafarers During Rescue Missions at Sea?  
The developments of extra-territorial human rights law, and the IO’s responsibility, discussed 
below, could potentially offer solutions to these legal problems, but it is noted with concern 
that seafarers may remain exposed to human rights violations due to the limitations of the 
contemporary human rights framework. While it was explained that the human rights 
jurisprudence has now established that those arrested and detained at sea are brought within 
the jurisdiction of flag States, the question that remains is whether seafarers are brought 
within the jurisdiction of those States, which conduct rescue missions and employ lethal force 
at sea.  
Apart from the personal link, discussed above, required for establishing extra-territorial 
human rights obligations, the case law developed on the occupied territories shows that States 
also have extra-territorial human rights obligations over the territories where they exercise 
effective control.124 The extra-territorial application of the ECHR was seriously restricted in 
the case of Banković, but the criticism the case received seems to have made the Court 
gradually depart from it.125 It is still worth noting that in Banković, the Court examined and 
                                                          
124 HRC, Concluding Observations regarding Israel (2003) CCPR/CO/78/ISR at 11, Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004 at 112, 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1970 16 at 125, 
Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections), ECtHR 23 March 1995 at 62, Cyprus v Turkey (1975) at 77-78 
125 See the commentary in R Lawson, ‘Life after Bankovic: On the Extraterritorial Application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ in F Coomans & MT Kamminga (eds) Extraterritorial Application of Human 
  The Human Rights of Seafarers 
38 
 
addressed the responsibility of 17 of the Contracting Parties, acting under the NATO 
authorisation, for the alleged violations caused by the airstrikes launched against the former 
Yugoslavia, and concluded that the nature of jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention 
remains ‘essentially territorial’.126 It was further added that the Convention can be applied 
extra-territorially only under exceptional circumstances, which require special justification.127 
In its more recent case law, the Court has shifted its focus again on the effective control 
States exercise on areas beyond their territories.128 In the case of Al-Skeini, the Court found 
the UK to have ‘assumed authority and responsibility for the maintenance of security in 
South East Iraq’ and hence, the effective control the UK exercised over the territory brought 
the deceased within the jurisdiction of the UK.129  
The ECtHR made another step towards a more liberal interpretation of Article 1 of the 
Convention in the Jaloud v the Netherlands case. The complaint was brought against the 
Netherlands for the lack of an effective investigation into the killing of the applicant’s son 
outside a vehicle checkpoint established by the Netherlands for contributing to security in 
south-eastern Iraq. The Court relied on the Al-Skeini reasoning to examine whether the 
Netherland’s had jurisdiction over the victim, but the nature of the checkpoint, as a vehicle 
one, could not leave much manoeuvre to the Court to rely on the spatial control that the 
Dutch forces might have had. The Court also considered the fact that the vehicle point was 
manned by Iraqi personnel, but found the Dutch forces to have retained the full command of 
the security operations.130 More importantly, the Court considered the key issue to have been 
that the vehicle checkpoint was established for the sole purpose of the Dutch forces assuming 
control and asserting authority over the persons passing through.131 On this basis, the Court 
concluded that the victim was within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands, when killed. 
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Whereas the Court made it clear, once again, that the ‘cause and effect notion’ of jurisdiction 
is not followed,132 it cannot be denied that the Jaloud reasoning lessens the threshold of 
effective control required by the earlier case law of the ECtHR.  
It seems that the strict personal or spatial link required for holding States accountable for 
extra-territorial human rights violations might not be easily satisfied in the case of the rescue 
missions conducted in the Horn of Africa, as it could be difficult to argue that flag States 
establish effective personal or territorial, within the ECtHR notion, during rescue missions. 
This could leave hostages exposed to more human rights violations. The recent case of 
Jaloud suggests that the Court has taken a more liberal approach to the interpretation of 
jurisdiction. In this light, it could be argued that the naval rescue missions off the Somali 
coasts bring seafarers within the jurisdiction of the operating States, as these are conducted 
for the purposes of assuming control and asserting authority over the persons on hijacked 
vessels. Although it might be still early for this argument, this would also echo the increasing 
calls for interpreting the personal and spatial links in a more liberal fashion that responds to 
the needs of a globalised world.133 It has been argued that there should be a shift from the 
personal and spatial link to the factual link. The latter is established between the acts of State 
agents and the persons whose human rights are affected by these acts and should suffice to 
bring the individuals within the jurisdiction of States.134 In the same vein, seafarers, whose 
human rights are directly affected by rescue missions, should fall under the jurisdiction of 
States and they should be entitled to human rights protection.  
3.3.2. The Question of Accountability: Are the International Organisations (IOs), the 
States, or Both Responsible for Ensuring Human Rights Compliant Rescue Missions 
at Sea?   
Turning to the question of whether hostages can be protected when their human rights are 
affected by the naval forces acting under the mandate of an IO, such as the NATO and EU, 
the answers given by the current case law also pose some difficulties to the seafarers’ 
effective protection. The ECtHR has acknowledged that the Convention does not prevent 
States from acceding to IOs, but they remain bound by their Convention obligations, when 
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they perform their other international duties and activities.135 However, problems arise with 
the cases of A and B Behrami v France and R Saramati v France, Germany and Norway, in 
which the Court had to examine the responsibility of States acting in Kosovo under the UN 
mandate. The Court concluded that the Member States could not be held accountable for 
human rights violations committed during the operations mandated by the UN in Kosovo 
based on the fact that under international law, the UN has a separate legal personality from 
that of its Member States.136 This judgment, similar to the Banković case, has faced criticism 
for excessively restricting the human rights obligations of States by virtue of their 
membership to an IO and it has been argued that the approach of the Court ‘sends a clear 
message to States that they can do whatever they wish and escape any human rights scrutiny 
so long as they shield themselves by obtaining the imprimatur of an international 
organisation’.137  
The Court has shifted its approach, as it was demonstrated in the Al-Jedda case. In this 
case, the Court found that the applicant’s detention in Iraq by British forces, acting under the 
UN mandate, should be attributed to the UK and not the UN, as the latter did not have 
effective control over the acts and omissions of the UK troops.138 In Jaloud v Netherlands, 
the Netherlands complained that it had no jurisdiction in Iraq, as its military force was 
assisting the UK in the security operations authorised by the UN in Iraq.139 However, the 
Court found that the Dutch troops were not placed at the disposal of Iraq or the UK and they 
had the full command of the checkpoint, where the applicant’s son was killed, which meant 
that the Netherlands had established jurisdiction over the victim regardless of whether 
another Contracting Party might also had concurrent jurisdiction.140  
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The adoption of the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations (ARIO) 
can also contribute to holding States and IOs accountable for their wrongdoing.141 The ARIO 
will have further implications for IOs and States, since it acknowledged that dual or multiple 
attribution of the same conduct is possible (Article 7).142 Article 7 could be well applied to 
cases where the different actors are interwoven with each other, such as in the cases of 
NATO and EU naval forces, where the States dispose their agents to an IO. In spite of the 
promising nature of Article 7, which seemingly captures the complex functioning of IOs in 
the 21st century, it has faced lots of criticism. The ‘effective control’ that an IO is required to 
have over the wrongful conduct that another organ place at its disposal will be arguably 
hardly satisfied in practice.143 The efficacy of the ‘effective control’ requirement is also 
questioned with reference to its applicability to the EU. It has been argued that ‘the approach 
based on “effective control” does not seem capable of capturing all the subtleties of the 
relationships between the EU and its Member States’.144 The effective control test might put 
further obstacles to the human rights scrutiny of the sea operations conducted by Operation 
Atalanta, as it could be questioned whether the national naval forces fighting against piracy 
off the Somali coasts will ever be under the effective control of the EU.  
Despite the criticism levelled at Article 7, the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court issued 
in the Dutchbat case demonstrates that States can be held responsible individually for their 
wrongful acts, even when they act under the mandate of an IO.145 In this case, it was 
examined whether the Netherlands could be held responsible for the decision of the Dutch 
contingent (Dutchbat) to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to force a few 
individuals to leave a compound where they had sought refuge, after the Dutch forces became 
aware of refuges being murdered outside the compound premises. The Dutch Supreme Court 
argued that Articles 6-9 DARIO ‘leave open the possibility of conduct being attributed to an 
international organisation and a State, which would then result in dual attribution to the 
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international organisation and the State concerned’.146 Although the decisions have been 
considered narrow because of not touching upon the issue that 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were 
killed outside Dutchbat,147 the hotly anticipated case of Mothers of Srebrenica confirms that 
shared responsibility between an IO and its contingent forces is not excluded.148 In this case, 
the applicants complained that the safe haven of Srebrenica safeguarded by the Dutch 
battalion was overrun by the Bosnian Serb forces resulting in the deaths of between 8,000 to 
10,000 individuals. The Court found that the Dutch forces had established ‘factual control’, 
as required by Article 7 of the ARIO and thus, they ‘did have effective control over providing 
humanitarian assistance to and preparation of Dutchbat’s evacuation of the refugees in 
the mini safe area’.149 The Court adopted a cautious approach and some limitations remain, 
but it is worth highlighting that the judgment opened the way to compensation for 300 deaths. 
The interpretation of Article 7 of ARIO given by the Dutch Courts makes a significant 
contribution towards enhancing accountability for peacekeeping operations150 and could also 
apply to the naval operations conducted by the maritime coalition forces that adversely affect 
the human rights of seafarers. Dual accountability of national and coalition naval forces for 
their wrongdoing can pave the way for a more enhanced protection in the context of rescue 
missions conducted for the release of seafarers off Somalia.  
Overall, naval operations should be commended for their effectiveness in the fight against 
piracy. The conduct of patrols off the coasts of Somalia has been an invaluable tool in 
preventing attacks and hostage-taking in compliance with the obligations of States to prevent 
and put an end to the human rights suffering of seafarers. While it should not be overlooked 
that naval operations often take place in adverse conditions and unfriendly waters and this 
makes it necessary for maritime forces to retain some flexibility in their counter-piracy 
responses, States have also to comply with their traditional negative human rights obligations 
ensuring that their naval forces, whether they act individually or under the shield of an IO, 
operate in a human rights compliant mode and respect the human rights of seafarers during 
the conduct of rescue missions.  
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4. THE WAY FORWARD: POSITIVE STEPS TOWARDS THE PROTECTION OF 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF SEAFARERS  
So far, it has been explained that seafarers suffer severe human rights violations, which for 
the time being, States have failed to address through their counter-piracy responses. The 
current counter-piracy efforts reflect the lack of a human rights oriented approach that could 
afford protection to the victims of piracy. However, there have been two distinct regional 
responses to piracy which focus on the suffering of seafarers that are worthy of special 
review, namely, the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Declaration condemning the violence 
against seafarers. 
The Djibouti Code was adopted by the Djibouti meeting that brought together the most 
affected by Somali piracy countries under the auspices of the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO). The Djibouti Code became effective in January 2009 and counts 20 
signatories.151 The commitment of States to the effective and timely implementation of the 
Code is illustrated by the establishment of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) and the 
Trust Fund, which was created in response to the initiative and generous offer of Japan.152 
From the victims’ perspective, the Djibouti Code is significant, as, inter alia, acknowledged 
the ‘grave dangers’ that seafarers face and accepted by consensus to commit to rescue 
hostages and offer proper treatment to victims of piracy.153  
To the same end aims the Declaration condemning the violence against seafarers, which 
was signed by the three largest flag states, the Marshall Islands, Liberia and Panama that 
represent between them the 40 per cent of the world’s shipping tonnage.154 The 
Commonwealth of Bahamas and St. Kitts also signed the joint declaration.155 The Declaration 
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recognises that the increasing violence against seafarers remains underreported.156 Therefore, 
the signatories affirmed their commitment to the collection and dissemination of information 
regarding the levels of violence against seafarers.157 The coordinated collation of information 
by four of the largest flag States aims to offer an invaluable tool to stakeholders that could 
use this credible data for the preparation and adoption of new strategies against piracy with a 
view to better protecting seafarers.  
Sadly, apart from the practical difficulties that these two initiatives encounter in achieving 
their aims, they both remain non-binding. This means that their effectiveness relies on the 
willingness of States, and compliance is not compelled by enforcement mechanisms. In 
addition, both the documents come into play after seafarers’ rights are violated. Although 
post incident responses should be praised, this is also indicative of the lack of focus in the 
human rights prevention phase, which is the most significant and most efficient stage to 
protect the human rights of seafarers. Despite the weaknesses, it is suggested that these 
regional responses offer an alternative bottom-up approach to the problem of the inadequate 
protection of the human rights of the victims of piracy. The more States join these efforts, the 
more effective the protection of the victims will become. Unlike the difficulties of a top-
down approach that would require States to convene and decide on this issue, increasing 
human rights initiatives escorted by extended State participation could offer constructive and 
timely solutions to the human rights gaps in the protection of seafarers.  
Before concluding, it is worth highlighting some crucial UN responses to the violations 
suffered by the victims of terrorist hostage-taking that could be relevant to hostages abducted 
by pirates. In 2011, the Advisory Committee of the Human Rights Council reported that ‘acts 
of terrorist hostage-taking generate multiple violations of human rights of […] victims’, and 
further acknowledged that human rights violations can also occur during counter-terrorism 
activities.158 Therefore, the Committee called on States to adopt responses to terrorist 
hostage-taking that ‘respect everyone’s right to life, liberty and security of person as 
enshrined in numerous human rights instruments and reaffirmed in the preamble to the 
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International Convention against the Taking of Hostages’.159 The UN Special Rapporteur on 
Counter Terrorism and Human Rights went beyond the recognition of the human rights 
violations stressing the positive human rights obligations of States to protect hostages.160 Mr. 
Emmerson noted with concern that as long as States seek a nexus to State responsibility for 
the violations of the human rights of hostages, this allows ‘victims of terrorism to remain as 
legally ossified “prisoners of doctrine”’ and leads to secondary victimisation.161  
The identical suffering and legal gaps in the protection of seafarers suggest that similar 
responses should be adopted by the UN in the context of piracy. These two reports summarise 
in the most eloquent manner most of the legal defects of the contemporary human rights 
framework discussed above that leave the victims of piracy exposed to violations. Thus, the 
emerging recognition of the violations of the human rights of the victims of terrorist hostage- 
taking and the relevant human rights obligations of States to protect hostages can become a 
beacon inspiring similar responses in the context of piracy.  
5. CONCLUSION  
This paper has highlighted the complexities of Somali piracy and shed light on one particular 
aspect that remains unexplored – the violations of the human rights of seafarers. Although it 
was discussed that the human cost of piracy has drawn the attention of the international 
community, the latter has been rather reticent about acknowledging that this human cost is 
nothing else but breaches of the human rights of seafarers, and especially those taken 
hostages. The reluctance of States to draw clear links between the human cost of Somali 
piracy and the human rights violations of its victims may be interpreted by virtue of the non-
state status of pirates. Pursuant to the traditional doctrine of State responsibility, States are 
not responsible for the wrongdoing of non-state agents and equally they cannot be blamed for 
the suffering of seafarers at the hands of pirates.  
The counter-piracy responses highlight the failure of States, and international 
organisations, to adequately recognise the human rights violations that seafarers suffer. The 
UNSC Resolutions that constitute the first collective response to piracy acknowledged rather 
late the threats posed to seafarers and the abuses they are subjected to creating human rights 
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gaps that remain unfilled. Additionally, the responses of the international community aiming 
to ensure the effective prosecution of those involved in pirate activities keep tripping over 
practical obstacles, the political unwillingness of States to get involved in this process, and 
more significantly the need to secure the human rights of pirates. The latter has led to the 
bizarre consequence of safeguarding the human rights of pirates, but losing sight of the right 
of their victims. Finally, the indispensable naval operations also suffer human rights flaws, as 
the lack of human rights precautions during the conduct of rescue missions has proved to be 
fatal for seafarers.  
Nonetheless, the human rights of seafarers can, and should, be protected. It is suggested 
that the development of the positive obligations that States have to prevent and put an end to 
violations, when they know or ought to have known that individuals are at risk, are applicable 
to seafarers. It is argued that it is now well-established that seafarers traversing the HRA are 
at risk and thus, States should protect them. Moreover, it was suggested that States engaging 
in counter-piracy operations should respect their negative human rights obligations regardless 
of the extra-territorial or allied character of these operations. These arguments can be upheld 
by the emerging recognition of the human rights violations suffered by the hostages and the 
pertinent human rights obligations of States in the context of terrorist hostage-taking. The 
work of the UN bodies towards an enhanced human rights framework effectively protecting 
the victims of terrorist hostage-taking could apply mutatis mutandis to the victims of pirate 
hostage-taking. These responses along with an improved bottom-up approach reinforced by 
regional counter-piracy responses to the suffering of seafarers can pave the way for the 
protection of the human rights of seafarers.  
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